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Abstract
Many of the import competing sectors in Moroccan agriculture are protected while water in irrigated agri-
culture is priced below its marginal  value product.  Establishing  a water market  in this pre-trade  reform
environment  can  be welfare  decreasing.  Further, as  the shadow price of water is  sensitive to the  crops
protected by trade policy,  farmers growing crops protected  pre-trade  reform can be made worse off post
reform.  The  resulting decline  in rents to  sector  resources  is  a source  of interest  group conflict  that can
slow the overall  reform process.  Using  an intertemporal  general  equilibrium model,  the paper analyzes
the economy-wide  effects  of the linkages between trade reform  and the reform  of water markets  in  irri-
gated agriculture.  We find a strong investment and growth  response to the trade reform, and a realloca-
tion of resources to the production of fruit and vegetable crops, for which Morocco has a strong compara-
tive advantage.  Trade  reform  is found  to  actually  create  an opportunity to  introduce  water pricing  re-
forms.  Creating a water user-rights  market post trade reform  not  only compensates  partially for the de-
cline in  rents to protected crops,  but also raises the efficiency  of water  allocation and hence  benefits the
economy as a whole.
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Introduction
As a semi-arid region  in the lower segment  of middle-income  category  of countries,
Moroccan  economic policy  continues to protect the import competing  sectors through an
array  of tariff and  non-tariff barriers  in  spite  of having  made  substantial  economic  re-
forms dating to the mid 1980s (Doukkali  1997).  Agriculture accounted for approximately
18.4 percent of GDP in  1994, 30 percent of export receipts, about 50 percent of the coun-
try's active  population, and  it consumes roughly  85 percent of the country's  scarce sup-
plies of mobilized  water.  Consequently,  trade  distortions  can  have  deleterious  conse-
quences to the rural sector of the economy,  and particularly to the efficient allocation of
the  country's  water  resources.  The  data  complied  by  Doukkali  (1997)  from  various
sources suggest that tariff rates of about 50 percent were imposed on the imports of wheat
and  industrial crops  while tariff rates  were on vegetable  and  fruits averaged  less than 7
percent.  In addition, there exist various non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade.  The tariff
equivalent rate calculated by Doukkali (1997)  for wheat and livestock ranged  from 160 to
270 percent,  respectively,  of their total  import values.  Some  sectors also  received pro-
ducer price  subsidies.  The subsidy  rates on the producer price  for wheat  was equivalent
to 28  percent  of the gross value  of wheat produced  in  1994,  and 3 percent  for industrial
crops.
According  to  a World  Bank  study  (The  World  Bank  1986),  Morocco  enjoys  a clear
comparative  advantage  in the production  of key irrigated  exportables,  such as fruits  and
vegetables.  The protected wheat  and industrial  crops  sectors use water  intensively  rela-
tive to  the dis-protected  crops,  such  as  fruits  and  vegetables,  thereby  consuming  water
that could otherwise be allocated to the more profitable crops to further their comparative
advantage  in world markets.  Depending  on the  country's water  allocation  policies  andwater development plans, correcting  for these distortions has at least the short-run benefit
of potentially  reducing the pressure  on water resources  while leading  to a more efficient
pattern of water allocation among crops.
Morocco's  water development plan entails increasing  national  water balances by con-
structing  large and medium-scale  dams to serve  regional demands  as well as the transfer
of water  between basins.  Currently, ten of the  largest  dams among  the 40 in  existence
carry 90 percent of the total  volume of water  flow.  Surface  flows account  for approxi-
mately  75 percent (8.5  billion cubic meters, The World Bank 1995,  p8) of total mobilized
water supplies.  As a major consumer of available  water resources,  the sector  is targeted
for technical  and institutional reforms aimed  at improving water use efficiency  (Dinar et
al.  1998).  However, its progress in this direction has been slowed.
Water resource  management  is currently executed  by nine Regional  Agricultural  De-
velopment Authorities  (ORMVA)  under the supervision of MAMVA.  The water charge
rate to farmers  is generally  viewed as only sufficient to  cover operation  and maintenance
costs.  As the water charge is below the price the  marginal users are willing to pay (i.e.,
below the  marginal  value  product  of water),  the distribution  of water must be  adminis-
tered  (The  World  Bank  1995,  p25).  When  the  "quota"  of water obtained  by farmers  is
below the  demand  for water at  the  given water  charge  rate,  then,  implicitly,  a  shadow
price for water exists.  Depending upon the marginal product of water allocated to various
crops,  this  price  will  vary  accordingly,  even  though  the  government  charges  the  same
price  per volumetric  of water (Tsur and Dinar 1995).  The  cost shares of water's contri-
bution  to  the  gross  value  of outputs  produced  in  the  irrigated  sector  are  estimated  by
Doukkali,1997  to vary from  13  to 37 percent,  while  water charges  administered by gov-
ernment  account  for  only  8 - 24  percent  of the  gross  value  of  outputs  (Ministere  de
l'Agriculture et de la Mise en Valeur Agricole Administration  du Genie Rural  1997, p4).
The  difference  between the shadow  price of water and  the  government's  charge  accrues
as  a benefit to the  farmer.  As the  intensity of water use varies by crop, such benefits  to
farmers growing different crops vary from an estimated  5 to  13  percent of the gross value
of the sectoral outputs.Nature of the Problem and Objectives  of the Paper
Protection  of the import competing  crops  alters the pattern  of employment  of other
agricultural  and  economy  wide  resources  in  their  favor.  Moreover,  in  an  environment
where irrigation water is priced below its shadow price so that it must be administratively
allocated,  raising  water  prices  while  leaving  trade  distortions  in  place  may  further  tax,
implicitly, the crops  which trade policy  discriminates against.  On the other hand,  in an
environment  where water  allocation  must  be administered,  reform  which  removes  pro-
tection received by producers of the import competing  crops may not induce the produc-
ers of these formerly protected crops to alter the pattern of water use, even though the use
of other resources  may  fall.  This  situation can  arise  when,  post trade  reform,  the new
shadow prices of water in the now dis-protected crops remain positive, albeit lower than
their prior values.
Many of the  other  effects  of trade  reform  will have  indirect  but no  less  important
benefits to agriculture.  They include incentives for households to save a proportion of the
increased  income  for investment, which of course increases  the returns  to other primary
resources  by expanding production possibilities over time.  Growth  in total  exports  also
provides  foreign  exchange  earnings  to  import  more  intermediate  inputs  at costs  lower
than would otherwise be possible from the local economy.
The first objective  of this paper is to provide  insights  into the relative  magnitude  of
these inter-linkages,  and to assess how trade  reform might  affect the level and pattern of
water allocation  in irrigated  agriculture.  Particular  attention is given to how this pattern
evolves as the economy approaches a new long-run equilibrium.
The second objective  is to ascertain whether reform of the country's water pricing  re-
gime  might  also  have  the  effect  of lowering  the  resistance  to  over-all  policy  reform.
Aside  from  trade  reform,  the  fact  that  the  administered  allocation  of water  results  in
varying water shadow prices across crops, in itself, raises the question as to whether pro-
ducers of various crops and their associations vary in political  influence.  Moreover,  wa-
ter  pricing  and  the  political  economy  of water  user-rights  in  irrigated  agriculture  are
likely to become  even  more  contentious  if trade  policy reform  is  pursued.  Since,  likemost  countries,  sector  specific  resources  are  unevenly  distributed  among  households,
policy  reform that alters the flow of rents to sector specific assets, including water rights,
almost always  benefits  some  at  the cost of others  even  though the economy  as  a whole
typically experiences  a net welfare  gain.
As  mentioned above,  when  the  water  charge price  is  below water's  marginal  value
product, there  exists an implicit subsidy to  farmers using  irrigation  water.  This implicit
subsidy is usually higher for the protected crops.  Such benefits are equivalent,  approxi-
mately,  to the  difference  between  water's  shadow  price  and  government  charge  price.
Since  policies favoring the  import competing sectors  have been  in place  for an extended
period of time, farmers producing  crops protected  by the old policies  will, at the margin,
be made worse of as the returns to the resources  specific these crops, including their wa-
ter quota, fall, at least in the  short run.  Returns to other crop specific resources  may also
fall.  These include  farmers'  investment  in skills and expertise  at growing crops  such as
sugar  beets  and  sugar  cane,  land  suitable  for  growing  irrigated  cereals  but  not easily
shifted to growing vegetables in the short run, and tree crops which typically require sev-
eral years  before the fruit can be profitably harvested.  If, in addition  to trade reform,  the
government  either re-distributed  the water "quota"  according  to the  post-trade  reform's
crop  growing plan or raised the water charge  price, then the returns to the relatively  crop
specific resources of those farmers  who  grow the formerly protected  crops would be  fur-
ther depressed.  It is individually and  often interest group rational  for the  growers of the
protected  crops to resist reform,  and to resist the reallocation of water quotas to the more
profitable  crops.  This source of conflict  often becomes a major stumbling bloc  to the en-
tire policy reform process.
However,  political resistance  to trade reform and  to the  reform of water  pricing may
be lowered if the decline in returns to the formerly protected crops can be at least partially
counter-balanced  by some  other scheme.  Thus, the  second goal  is to  evaluate the poten-
tial  of a water rights pricing scheme  that may be made possible  by economy-wide  trade
reform which can counter-balance  these losses  while also leading to a more efficient allo-
cation  of water  among crops.  The  establishment  of a water  rights market could  poten-
4tially provide  such a mechanism.  The  scheme  we  investigate  is  a water  rental  market
where water user-rights can be traded among farmer in irrigation sector, while the owner-
ship of the user-right  is based on a farmer's  historical  pre-reform  allotment of water  (or
water quota).
The  analysis  is  based  on  an  intertemporal  general  equilibrium  model  developed  by
Diao and Somwaru (1997),  and draws in many ways upon the recent contributions of dy-
namic CGE  modeling  by Ho  1989;  McKibbin  1993;  Mercenier  and  Sampafo  de  Souza
1994; Go  1994; Diao et al.  1998.  We utilize the model to simulate both the short- and the
long-run transitional dynamic  effects  of trade reforms  and  a water-user  rights market  in
the  context  of a  whole  economy.  The  model  is  dynamic  in the  sense  that  firms  and
households  make  intertemporal  optimization  decisions,  i.e.,  forward  looking  behavior,
such that a change  in trade policy  and water price  policy will affect savings,  investment,
and capital  accumulation  activities  of the  economic  agents  modeled.  The  focus of the
study  is  agriculture,  especially  the irrigated  agricultural  sector.  However,  a change  in
non-agricultural  trade policies  also affects agriculture through changes  in relative prices,
allocation of resources,  and investment decisions.  Hence,  the model is built as a general
equilibrium  model,  i.e.,  all  economic  activities,  including  the non-agricultural  sectors,
consumers and government consumption, are included in the model.
Plan of the Paper and Principle Findings
The  paper is divided  into  four main  sections.  In Section II,  a brief overview of the
inter  temporal  general  equilibrium  model  is  presented  followed  by  a discussion  of the
data.  Section  III  discusses  the  short- and longer-run  effects  of trade reform alone,  with
emphasis  on agriculture  and the irrigation  sector  in particular.  We  find a strong invest-
ment and growth response to reform,  and a reallocation  of resources to the production  of
fruit and vegetable crops.  The shadow price of water rises in some sectors but falls in the
others.  Hence,  from  a political  economy  perspective,  it is rational for  the farmers  in a
sector  in  which the  water  shadow price  falls to  resist trade  reform.  In  Section  IV,  we
analyze  the opportunity  provided  by trade reform to establish a water user-rights market
which, at the same time, at  least partially compensates  those who might otherwise resistboth economy-wide  and water policy  reforms because of the decline  in their real  income
that reform would cause.  We find that allowing farmers to rent in or out water user rights
leads  to  further  economic  efficiencies  that  can  even  be  detected  at  the  national  level,
while at the same time, mitigating  the post-reform  decline  in income  of those producers
producing the pre-reform protected crops.
Overview  of the Methodology  and Data
The  model is based on inter temporal  general equilibrium  theory  with a multi-sector
specification.  For the purpose of the study, the Moroccan economy is aggregated  into 20
production  sectors,  including  6  irrigated  agricultural  sectors,  6  rainfed  agricultural  sec-
tors, 4 agriculturally related sectors and 4 nonagricultural  sectors.  There are 6 commodi-
ties  produced  by  the  agricultural  sectors  (Table  1).  The  description  of the  economic
agents'  behavior in the model and the data are as follows:
Firms and Investment
We assume that the  representative  firm (or farmer)  in each  sector operates  with con-
stant returns to scale technology.  The representative firm chooses at each time period the
quantities of inputs and level of investment to maximize the value of the firm.  Inputs are
labor, capital,  land,  water,  and  other intermediates,  while  the investment  inputs are for-
gone final  goods produced  domestically plus imports.  The  value added production  func-
tion is of Cobb-Douglas  form, while  the intensities of intermediate goods are  fixed.  La-
bor and  capital  are  classified  as  agricultural  (including  rural  services)  and non  agricul-
tural.  Overtime,  sectoral  capital  accumulates  while  the  other  factors  of production  are
permitted  to re-allocate  within  the  agricultural  and non-agricultural  sectors,  but not  be-
tween sectors.  For example, agricultural  labor can be reallocated  among the various pro-
duction sectors  in agriculture,  but migration to the  non-agricultural  sectors is  not permit-
ted,  and  likewise  for urban  labor  and capital.  Land  is  classified  as  irrigated  and  non-
irrigated.  Irrigation  water is initially  controlled and  distributed  by  the government  who
collects a water charge from  farmers in the irrigated  sector.  Because  of data constraints,
the use of water by the urban sector is omitted from the analysis.
6Firms  are  presumed  to  finance  investment  outlays  by  retaining  profits  so  that  the
number of firm equities within the economy  remains unchanged.  The non-arbitrage  con-
dition derived from the first order condition of the firm's profit maximization implies
S2
Ki,  t
where  wki,t is  sectoral  marginal product  of capital;  Tobin's qi,t is the  shadow  price  of
capital; Ki,t is sectoral capital  stock; Pli, is value of per unit of investment goods;  i,  t is
quantity of sectoral physical investment; 5  is physical capital depreciation rate; rt is inter-
est rate, and  biPi,  tKli,  t/Ki, )2  denotes the installation/adjustment  cost per unit of capital.
The  output of each  sector, except  for the sectors of rural  services  and public admini-
stration, can be exported abroad or consumed domestically.
Households and Consumption/Savings
Households  behave  as  extended  immortal  families.  They  are  aggregated  into two
groups:  rural and urban.  Rural  households  own agricultural  labor,  capital, and  land. Ur-
ban  households  own  non-agricultural  labor  and  capital.  The  representative  household
makes consumption and saving decisions  to maximize an inter-temporal utility function.
The Euler equation  derived  from the first order condition of utility maximization implies
that the marginal  utility across two adjacent periods satisfy the following condition:
u',l(1 + p)l  _  Ptc,I+(1  +r,+,  )
u'  Ptc,  (1)
where ut' is the derivative of the instantaneous  felicity function, ut, at time t with respect
to the aggregate  consumption  Qt, generated  from  the  thirteen  final  goods;  p  is  positive
and represents the rate of time preference;  and Ptct is the consumer price index.  Equation
(1) implies that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time t and t+1  is
equal to the ratio of the consumption price index  at time t and t+1.  A sequence of aggre-
gate household consumption and savings are determined simultaneously from Eq. (1).Demand  for final  goods  (including  demand by private  households,  the  government,
the firms  as intermediate  inputs  and investment  inputs)  is satisfied by domestic  produc-
tion  and  imports,  and  with  the  famous  Armington  Assumption  (Armington  1969),  do-
mestic  goods and imported goods are imperfect substitutable.
Government Policies
The government intervenes  in the economy  using host of instruments: taxes and sub-
sidies,  import  tariffs,  indirect  taxes  on producers,  households  taxes/subsidies,  producer
support price subsidies,  and non-tariff barriers.  The government  is also presumed  to im-
pose a water charge  by the method of volumetric  pricing.  All  policy variables  are exoge-
nous.
The Data
Data on sectoral  outputs  and inputs, household  and government consumption,  invest-
ment, exports  and imports,  as  well as  levels of various  taxes and subsidies  are  obtained
from a Social  Accounting  Matrix of Morocco  developed  by  Doukkali,  1997.  The  data
represents the  Moroccan  economy  in  1994,  including the various  levels of interventions
mentioned  above.  The  data  on  irrigated  areas,  water consumption  by  crops  and  so  on
were obtained by Doukkali from the  annual reports  of ROIs to the central administration
supervising  irrigation  (Department  of Rural  Engineering),  from  this  department's  own
estimates  as well as from other departments of the  Ministry of Agriculture.  The authors
then  compared  these  estimates  with  data  available  from  other  studies  of the  irrigation
sector conducted  by international  and national  organization  (FAO  1982,  1985,  1986  and
1987;  The  World Bank  1995).'  The  share  of water charges  to the  gross  value of output
were calculated  from a table in Section 3, p4,  of Ministere  de l'Agriculture  et de la Mise
en Valeur Agricole Administration  de Genie Rural (1997).
'All  of these are done by Doukkali  1997.The Effects  of Trade Reform on the Economy
In this analysis, total reform is presumed,  i.e.,  all import tariffs, non-tariff barriers,  as
well as producer price  supports are eliminated.2  As the main purpose of the study is not
to focus on the trade liberalization  per se, we do not model the process of the reform, e.g.,
which policy should change first and by what magnitude. These are the subject of a future
paper focusing on growth and growth externalities.
Trade  liberalization  will  cause sectoral  production,  capital  investment,  consumption
and savings,  and  trade  to  adjust.  Since  the  model  is dynamic,  these  adjustments  take
time, which allows us to estimate both the short- and long-run effects of reforms.  During
the  adjustment  process,  the demand for water,  and the shadow price  of irrigation  water
also change.  Hence,  the political  economy  of water issue  is likely to  arise as a result of
the  trade reform.  Such effects  come not only  from changes in producer prices,  but also
from lowered  returns to  the  water  "quota"  common  to  those  sectors  at their  respective
pre-reform  volume.  As we  mentioned  above,  when  the water  charge price  is below the
marginal product of water, there exists an implicit subsidy to farmers  who  use irrigation
water.  Such  benefits  are  equivalent,  approximately,  to  the  difference  between  water's
shadow price and government charge price.  If the government further reduced the water
"quota"  for those farmers who grow the crops protected pre-reform,  those farmers would
be further hurt by the reform.
To capture  the economy-wide  as  well as sectoral  effects of the trade reform, we first
fix the water "quota"  allocated to different  sectors at the  level given by the data, i.e.,  we
first ignore the possible effects caused by water quota redistribution on farmers  who grow
different  crops.  While  irrigable  land can be allocated to different crops within the sector
by its owners,  land cannot be reallocated  instantaneously.  Thus, we allow the land allo-
cation cross irrigable crops to require time to fully adjust, with about a 5 year lag after the
trade  reforms  take  place.  This assumption  is based  on the  fact that  some resources  are
sector/crop  specific,  such  as  land  and  farmers'  investment  in  skills  and  expertise  at
2 This analysis also abstracts from the country's historical rates of growth in total factor productivity.growing specific crops.  Hence, growers of sugar beets or sugar cane cannot easily  switch
to growing vegetables or fruits in the short run.
Economy-Wide  Effects of Trade Reform:  Welfare  Gains and Income  Growth
The results show a strong economy-wide  growth effect from the removal of the trade
distortions and  subsidies.  Post  reform,  the  country's  GDP  increases  by  2  percent  in the
short-run, rising to  10 percent in the long-run (Figure  1), relative to the status quo.  Social
welfare,  in the money metric of equivalent variation,  rises by 4 percent.3  Households  in
the rural area benefit  more than those  in the urban area, in part, because  we assume  that
the  government  obtains,  in lump  sum,  taxes  on urban  households to cover  the  revenue
loss from tariffs.4  The real income  for rural households  as  a group rises  by  5 percent in
the short-run and 14 percent in the long-run (Table 2).
Perhaps more importantly, the economy-wide  gains  from reform mainly accrue  from
two sources:  efficiency  gains  from  the allocation  of resources to  more  profitable activi-
ties, and the more rapid accumulation of capital due to the more profitable investment  al-
ternatives.  The growth in the stock of capital not only  increases  wealth,  but it also raises
the rental rates of primary resources,  such as land and water, and labor.
Interestingly, the urban - rural effects of reform on capital accumulation  are not sym-
metric  (Figure  2).  Urban  investment  rises  sharply  almost  immediately  after  the  reform
takes place,  while rural investment  in the  first three years  is  not sufficient  to replace de-
preciated  capital,  but subsequently,  rises  in the  medium  and long-run.  In the  long-run,
the  growth  in investment  results  in capital  stocks  that are  larger than base  stocks  by  26
and  12  percent  in  the  urban  and  rural  sectors,  respectively.  The  major reason  for this
pattern is that the  non-farm sector  is relatively  more distorted than the  farm sector.  Tar-
iffs on non-farm import competing goods averaged  about 28 percent, and about 19.5  per-
cent  on export competing goods.  Tariffs  on sugar products  and processed  food  were  54
3 This measure was derived by Mercenier  and Yeldan  1997, and  is based on the  household's inter-temporal
utility function.
4 Of course, this assumption  has no affect on the allocation of resources.
10percent and 23 percent,  respectively.  The  initial decline and then growth in capital  stock
in the rural sector reflects the effects of the lag required in shifting land from the produc-
tion  of the  protected  crops  into  the  production  of, primarily,  other  cereals,  fruits  and
vegetables and, at least initially, the relatively more profitable investment opportunities in
the non-farm sector.  Of course, these  investment opportunities induce households,  in the
short-run,  to forgo  some consumption thus  causing  a decline  in their demand  for goods
and services.
Agricultural laborers as a group, as well as land owners,  benefit from reforms.  In the
long-run, the agricultural real wage rate rises by 16 percent, while returns to irrigated land
rises by  14 percent and 9 percent for other lands (Table 2).  However, the increase  in the
agricultural  wage  rate is still lower than that of non-agricultural  wage (which rises by 25
percent) due in part to the relatively  larger increase in the urban capital  stock.  The wid-
ened rural-urban income gap is likely to place further pressures on labor migration out of
primary agriculture  and into rural non-farm  and urban enterprises.  The relative shortage
of labor  in  the non-farm  sector limits  the  competitiveness  of its  traded  goods  in world
markets.
Eliminating trade  protection  stimulates  the country's  trade, both imports  and exports
rise, but total exports rise more than the increase  in imports by 4 percentage points in the
short-run and 8 percent points  in the long-run (Figure  1).  The change in sectoral  exports
and imports is summarized  in the "Without water user-right market" panel of Table 4.
Sectoral Effects of Trade Reform: Some  Gain and Some Lose
Trade  reform, (eliminating  tariff and  non-tariff barriers  and the abolishment  of pro-
ducer  price  supports)  changes  relative  prices  faced  by  producers.  Farmers  producing
protected crops are made worse off, post reform, as they face lower relative output prices
and the  gross  value of their output  falls.  Other sectors  benefiting  from reform  compete
for  the  inputs  of agricultural  labor,  capital  and  other  intermediate  inputs,  causing  the
rental rates of many of these inputs to rise.  These two forces working together, lower the
returns to the relatively  crop specific  factors of production in the  formerly protected  sec-
tors.  Our simulation results (Table  3)  suggest that in the short and intermediate  run, the
11returns to  irrigated  land, normalized  by consumer  price index,  falls for wheat, especially
soft wheat, but rises for the other crops.  The result is not surprising as wheat production
was highly protected  by tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
Changes  in the return to  land encourage  farmers to  adjust,  with a lag,  their cropping
pattern.  In the  simulation, we allow  the readjustment  of land to  occur over  a  five year
interval.  In the real  economy,  the period of adjusted may be more  crop dependent,  with
some  land  never  being  reallocated  to  other  crops.  Hence,  the  simulation  should  be
viewed as providing an upper bond to land adjustment.  From  such a "best case"  adjust-
ment, returns to irrigated land rise by  11  percent in the first  10 years and 15 percent in the
long-run.
Effects on Sectoral Water Shadow Prices: Some Rise and Some Fall
Given  no change  in  the  government's  water pricing  and distribution  policy,  reform
causes  the  returns  to  farmers'  water "quota"  to change  by relatively  large  and  differing
magnitudes.  As discussed  previously,  since  the water charge rate  is lower than the  price
that the  marginal  user of water is  willing to pay,  the excess  demand for water  has  to be
constrained  by the government's  distribution policy.  Hence, a water shadow price is as-
sociated  with  each  water "quota."  The  difference  between  the  water  shadow price  and
government charge  is equivalent  to the rent farmers earn from  the water "quota".  In the
first simulation, trade liberalization  causes  the shadow price of the water "quota"  for soft
wheat production  to fall over the entire horizon required  to reallocate  some  (not all)  land
from  soft wheat to other crops,  and  to  decline  for the case of hard wheat  in the short-run
(bottom panel,  Table 3).  In  other sectors,  the shadow  price of water rises with the  mag-
nitude of change varying  cross  sectors,  ranging  from a high of more  than 20  percent  for
the case of vegetable  and fruits to  a low of less than  10  percent for  the case of industrial
crops.  After the five year adjustment, the shadow price  of land equilibrates  across crops
(top panel, Table  3).
It  is obvious that a close link exists between  changes  in the  sectoral  shadow price  of
water and rates  of trade protection.  The data  show that, pre-reform,  wheat production  is
highly protected  while vegetable and fruits are less protected.  When tariff and non-tariff
12trade barriers  are removed,  and producer  support price policies  are  abolished,  the coun-
try's comparative  advantage  in  the production  of vegetable  and fruits  can be more  fully
realized.  This increases the derived demand for water and willingness to pay for water in
these sectors.  On the other hand, the loss of protection to the producers of irrigated wheat
and industrial crops cause their production to fall  (top panel, Table 5).  The producers of
these commodities also experience a concomitant decline in the returns to the  water use-
rights they held from the government's distribution policy.
Generally speaking, as any policy  reform almost always affects somebody's  inter-
est negatively,  the most difficult task in the reform processes  is to find a feasible way to
compensate  and hence to reduce the resistance of interest groups hurt by the reform. The
results  from  the  first  simulation  have  two  important  implications  in  this  regard.  First,
farmers producing  the pre-reform  protected crops are "doubly hurt" due to a lower output
price  and  a  lower water shadow  price.  Farmers  producing  the dis-protected  crops  gain,
but could gain potentially more if the water "quota" is redistributed. That is, if, post-trade
reform,  the government  reduces  the  water  "quota"  to  farmers  of the  formerly  protected
crops in proportion to the  fall in their production,  they are made even worse off although
water would be allocated more efficiently.  In principle,  it is individually rational for these
producers  to resist such reforms.  Second,  the changes  in water shadow prices caused  by
trade reform create an opportunity to form a water user-rights market.  In this case, we en-
vision  nothing  more  than  giving  farmers  entitlement  to  their  pre-reform  water  user's
rights, that is, the right to earn the market rents from their historical water "quota".
There are two major benefits from  allowing farmers  whose production  falls, post
reform,  to  rent out  some  (not all)  of their water  user-rights.  Renting  out some  of their
water use-rights  reduces  the post reform  costs  faced by farmers  whose  incomes are  hurt
by reform, and hence a tendency to reduce the political  resistance to reform.  Second, cre-
ating  a water  user-rights  market should  also  increase the  efficiency of water  allocation,
yielding benefits to the  whole economy  by providing  incentives for the better husbandry
of Morocco's scarce water resources.
13The Moroccan  government has  faced difficulties  and encountered delays  in its efforts  to
improve  water use  efficiency.  A  reason  is that  the  government's  water supply  organiza-
tions (ORMVAs) are apparently reluctant to accept more responsibility in developing the
country's  water resources without any additional  compensation (Dinar et al.  1998). Also,
when the benefits from pricing  water below its opportunity  cost become  embodied in the
value of the  land or other factors,  it  is politically  very difficult for virtually any govern-
ment to charge and collect water revenues commensurate  with either its actual cost or its
opportunity cost.
The  creation of water  user-rights  market may  not  generate  revenue  for the gov-
ernment in the short term. Nevertheless,  the existence  of such a market,  in which transac-
tions among farmers  makes  explicit the rental price of water, should  eventually separate
the returns to water from that to the  land. This in turn should make  further reform  in wa-
ter prices relatively  easy, such as  the imposition  of a water tax to help  defray the public
costs of water mobilization and distribution. A water user-rights market should eventually
allow water to be  treated as  a normal commodity,  providing  private  agents  with greater
incentives to invest in the maintenance  of water sector capital  and to better husband this
resource.
Win-Win Outcomes from Creating a Water User-Rights  Market
In the  second  scenario,  in addition to trade  reform,  farmers  within each  irrigated
sector  are allow to rent in or out in their water user-rights.  Farmer's entitlement  to water
user-rights  are  assumed  to be  determined  by  the  water  quota allotted  them by  the gov-
ernment  according  to the  farming  practices  in the  pre-reform  period.  The  rental price  is
set at the  market  clearing  shadow  price  for water  and  is  solved  simultaneously  with  all
other  endogenous variables  in the  model. Of course, there exists numerous  adjudication,
technical and practical problems  in forming a water market, many of which are discussed
by Thobanl  (1997).  While these very  real problems are ignored  here, the  simulation nev-
ertheless  provides  empirical  insights  into  the  relative  nature  of the  possible  gains  from
such a water market pricing scheme.
14The  results  show clearly  that allowing  farmers  to  rent their water  user-rights  to
others, not only increases the efficiency of water use, but also compensates them partially
for the loss suffered in the production of the pre-reform protected commodities.
Gains from a Water  User-Rights  Market: Counter-Balancing Post Reform Losses
The trade in water  user rights among  farmers  in  the perimeter  causes some  (not
all)  water  to  be  allocated  away  from  crops  yielding  a relatively  low  return  (i.e.,  low
shadow price).  Since water is now paid its full marginal value product,  the level of total
water  use can also change.  Simulation  results show that there are  two  sectors  in which
water consumption increases:  other cereals (exclusive of wheat) and vegetable  and fruits.
Water consumption in the other three sectors, soft wheat, hard wheat and industrial crops,
falls (Table  7).  This change in water consumption is consistent with the economy's post-
reform comparative  advantage.
The producers of soft wheat earn income  by renting some (not all) of there water
user-rights to producers producing,  post refrom,  more profitable crops. This causes a de-
crease  in their production of soft wheat (table 5),  and a releasing of some labor and other
resources  for employment in the more profitable crops. However,  even in this open econ-
omy, the decline in supply of the formerly protected  crops causes  the producer prices of
these  crops to  rise (bottom panel,  table 6).  This occurs  because  domestic  wheat is not a
perfect  substitute  for  imported  varieties.  Table  6  shows  that without  a  water  market,
relative  to the  base period,  the  post trade  reform  producer price  of soft  wheat  falls  by
more than 20 percent  in the short-tun, and more than 5 percent in the medium- and long-
run.  The  establishment  of a  water  user-rights  market  and the  subsequent  decline  in the
production of soft wheat causes the price of soft wheat to fall by less than one percent  in
the first year and then  to rise  about one percent  in the  long-run,  relative  to  the base.  A
similar result is observed for the price of industrial crops.
Of course, the  decline in domestic  supply of soft wheat and  industrial crops,  and
the  resulting excess demand  for these commodities  is partially satisfied by imports. This
result  is shown by the  rise in imports of soft wheat and industrial crops in the short- and
15medium run (bottom panel,  table 4). In the long-run, exports exceed the value of imports
by the amount required to service the country's foreign debt.
Trade and  water market reform still  results  in a decline in  the gross value of the
outputs of wheat and industrial crops (table 8). The simulation results show that returns to
land  fall  less in the  first 5 years  and increase  there after  when a market  for water  user-
rights  exists (upper right panel of table 3).  This result  indicates that  the revenue  loss  to
the growers of wheat and industrial crops  is partially compensated for by the increase  in
the returns to the irrigated  land as  well  as revenues  earned in renting  out water.  For the
growers  of wheat  and  industrial  crops,  the  major  compensation,  of course,  accurse  di-
rectly from the rental income to the farmer's entitlement to the water user rights.
These values are shown in Table 9.  We use the difference  between the two levels
of water shadow prices,  before and after water right trading  is permitted,  i.e.,  we use the
implicit rental value given by the unit gain/loss for each volume of water rented in/out by
farmers,  and then multiply this  value  by the  traded volume  of water  to obtain  the total
gains/losses for each sector. The volume is the sectoral  water "quota"  given by the data,
minus  the  same  sector's  water  consumption  after  water  trading  is  permitted.  As  some
sectors are more aggregated,  and hence use more water, to report the absolute value of the
gains may  be misleading.  Thus, the  gains/losses  from water  sales  are compared  (in per-
cent terms) with the returns to water in the base data, pre-trade reform and water market-
ing.  To make this more clear, consider the following example.  The result that growers of
soft wheat gain  19.02 percent  from renting  their water user-rights to  others, implies that,
in  comparison  with the  returns  they  received  implicitly  from the  shadow price  of their
water  "quota"  pre-reform,  an  additional  19  percent  of revenue  can  be  generated  from
renting some of their water "quota" to the growers of other crops.
Three sectors,  soft wheat, hard wheat and  industrial crops, rent out water over the
entire  time  period.  We  see  that  (from  the  bottom  panel  of Table  9)  the  rents  earned
amount  to a relatively  large  gain for soft wheat growers  (19  - 13  percent) and a smaller
gain (about one percent) for growers of hard wheat and industrial crops.  Even though the
shadow price of water for some sectors does not fall post reform,  growers in these sectors
16still gain directly  from renting  in water (i.e.,  from paying the water user-right  rental fees
to the  original  owners  in  the  wheat  and  industrial  crop  sectors).  The  results  show that
only the growers of vegetables and fruits rent in water for the entire period, while growers
in the other cereal sectors rent in some water in the long-run,  i.e.,  as capital accumulation
occurs.
Why are the growers of vegetable  and fruits  willing to pay the rental charges  for
the additional  water? The reason is that with  a fixed water "quota,"  the shadow price of
water in these sectors is much higher, post-reform, than the market clearing price for wa-
ter if traded (Table  3). This implies that the growers  in these sectors are willing to pay a
high rental price  for water in order to earn greater returns to their resources.  As the rental
rate paid by the  growers of vegetable  and  fruits  is  lower than the  shadow price of the
post-reform  quota,  the growers  paying  the  water  rental  charges  still  benefit  from  such
trading.
It should also be noted from table 3 that a water market has positive long-run ef-
fects on the rental rates of irrigable lands, and on rural wages since the more efficient use
of water increases the marginal product of rural labor employed in the fruit and vegetable
sectors.  This lessons the  gap between urban-rural  wages as the urban wage rate remains
virtually unchanged  post-water  market. Returns  to other non-irrigable  land  falls slightly,
post water market.  The reason  is that  the irrigated  sector becomes more  competitive due
to the more efficient use of water, and hence,  competes with the non-irrigated  sectors for
agricultural  labor  and  capital.  However,  in  contrast  to  the  status  quo,  returns  to  non-
irrigable  land are  still significantly  higher than  the corresponding  pre-reform  rates.  This
result suggests that the  negative  effects of a water market on the  non-irrigation  sector is
quite small and hence there is  less reason  for any political  resistance to  reform from that
sector.
Thus,  creating  water  rental  markets  among  the  farmers  is,  post  trade  reform,  a
"win-win"  strategy, as almost all farmers and farm labor benefit,  and water resources are
allocated more efficiently.  However,  in the real economy, there are surely the mentioned
transaction costs of forming such a market, costs which are not taken into account here.
17Conclusion
In spite of significant policy reforms, the import competing  sectors of the Moroc-
can economy  tend to be heavily protected  while water is priced  below its marginal value
product  in  irrigated  agriculture.  Agriculture,  employs  about  50 percent  of the  country's
work force and consumes  approximately  85  percent of her total water resources.  Conse-
quently,  the  efficient allocation  of her water resources  are  not only  dependent  on water
pricing and distribution policies within agriculture, but also on her foreign trade, producer
price  support,  and  indirect tax  policies.  In the  absence  of trade  reform, however,  aban-
doning the  administrative  allocation  of water  quotas  in favor  of a  more  market  driven
water allocation  scheme  could be  welfare  decreasing  because  water  could  well  be allo-
cated in the direction of the protected crops.
Within  this context,  an inter-temporal  general  equilibrium  model  is used  to ana-
lyze the  economy-wide  effects of trade reform as  well as the effects on the different irri-
gated agricultural  sectors.  We  find  a strong  investment and growth response  to trade re-
form,  and  a reallocation  of resources  to  the production  of fruit and vegetable  crops,  for
which  Morocco  has  a  strong  comparative  advantage.  Trade  reform  causes  the  shadow
price of water to rise  for the case of fruits and vegetables  crops relative  to the pre-reform
protected crops. The change  in returns to sector specific  assets caused  by reform is likely
to induce  interest  group conflicts  since  reform  causes  some  farmers  growing  crops pro-
tected pre-reform to be made worse  off post reform.  On the other hand, trade reform may
create an opportunity to introduce water pricing reforms because farmer's made worse off
post reform,  can earn income  from renting  out some of their water to others.  The results
suggest  that creating  a  water user-rights  market  not only  compensates  partially  for  the
losses of farmers made worse off, post trade reform, but also raises the efficiency  of water
allocation and hence  benefits the economy  as a whole.
As the government water charge rate in Morocco  is far below  its real costs (taking
into account  investment costs of water mobilization),  and below its opportunity  cost, it is
almost  politically  impossible  for  the  government  to  charge  and  collect  water  revenues
commensurate with either the actual marginal cost of water or its opportunity cost. This is
18particularly  the case when  the  benefits  of a  low water  charge has  been  in existence  for
such a  long period of time that the value of water's  shadow price becomes  embodied  in
the  value of the  land  or other  factors of production.  Even  though the creation  of water
user-rights market may not generate  revenue for the government  in the near term, such a
market reveals  to all the opportunity cost of water which should, eventually,  separate  the
returns to water from that to the land. This in turn should make further reform to help de-
fray government  costs, such as  imposing  water price tax,  or a property tax on a farmer's
water  right entitlement,  relatively  easy.  Furthermore,  a water  user-rights  market should
eventually  cause  water to  be treated  like  any other  normal  good,  and private  agents  in-
centives to invest in the water sector and to better husband this scarce resource.
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o;  \d4.)Table 9. Gains from Water Reallocation  by a Water User-Right Market
Year 1  Year 5  Year 10  Steady  State
Water shadow price without water user-rights market,  % of the status quo
Soft wheat  62.73  65.25  74.64  77.77
Hard wheat  98.42  101.40  106.44  111.45
Other cereals  109.82  110.95  115.79  123.33
Industrial  crops  105.79  106.38  106.46  108.00
Vegetable  and fruits  120.89  120.34  122.95  125.02
Water shadow price with water user-rights market,  % of the status quo
111.24  111.58  114.93  118.26
Sectoral demand for water after water user-rights traded,  % of the status quo
Soft wheat  60.79  62.16  67.73  68.49
Hard wheat  89.56  91.77  93.34  94.81
Other cereals  99.21  99.78  100.82  103.36
Industrial  crops  93.64  94.09  90.66  89.57
Vegetable and  fruits  109.74  108.84  107.88  106.42
Direct gains from  water user-rights market,  % of the status quo
Soft wheat  19.02  17.53  13.00  12.75
Hard  wheat  1.34  0.84  0.57  0.35
Other cereals  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.17
Industrial  crops  0.35  0.31  0.79  1.07
Vegetable  and fruits  0.94  0.77  0.63  0.43RECENT  BULLETINS
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